

Ostpolitik, 1969–1974

EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL RESPONSES

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GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
Washington, D.C.
and



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

PART I

Adversaries and Allies

Dealing with Bonn

Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Response to West German Ostpolitik

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During the Brezhnev years, détente, the relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, was shaped by the special configuration of the post-Khrushchev leadership. Within the "division of labor" among the three Soviet leaders who inherited power after October 1964, Nikolai Podgorny became the formal leader of the USSR, holding the position of chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet; Alexei Kosygin became chairman of the Council of Ministers with responsibility for economic and international affairs; and Leonid Brezhnev became general secretary of the Communist Party, which under a totalitarian regime included a very broad range of issues.

Brezhnev's involvement in international affairs emerged from his discussions with East European communist leaders over significant foreign policy issues.¹ During the July 1966 Bucharest gathering of party chiefs of the six Warsaw Pact member countries, Brezhnev proposed that a European Security Conference (ESC) become the main common goal of all socialist countries. The ESC would not only mark the symbolic close of World War II and requite the enormous suffering of the Soviet people but would also underscore the Soviet Union's victory, legitimize the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)'s monopoly of power in the one-party Soviet dictatorship, and provide Moscow with a dominant role in setting the agenda

1 Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Peace, Détente and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of Public Statements* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); also the following secondary works: R.L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism': The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006): 133-58; and Amir Weiner, "Déjà vu All Over Again: Prague Spring, Romanian Summer and Soviet Autumn on the Soviet Western Frontier," *ibid.*, pp. 159-94.

for Europe's future. Brezhnev's ambitious "struggle for peace," which was warmly welcomed by the Soviet public, would over the next seven years transform the general secretary from a "first among equals" in the post-Khrushchev provisional triumvirate into the unquestioned head of the Soviet Union.

Initially, however, the Soviet leadership was divided over the impact of such a policy. In undertaking an uncharted and risky policy to achieve the ESC, Brezhnev was forced to make many concessions. Indeed, he was willing to do this and to involve himself personally in formulating positions. Brezhnev's three principal allies were Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, the Head of the State Security Committee (KGB) Yuri Andropov, and Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, who were all in favor of expanding Soviet foreign policy in a European direction that would also expand their own influence among the Soviet ruling elites. Moreover, Soviet aims went beyond the principle of the inviolability of European borders and also contained a new vision of Eurasia. After the Ussuri/Wusuli clashes with Maoist China in March 1969, its Asian frontiers also became a vital interest of the Soviet Union.

The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 represented the most striking acknowledgment by the Soviet leadership of the flaws in the GDR's socialist system and of its falling behind capitalist West Germany. During the following years, Moscow became increasingly concerned over the expansion of economic cooperation between the Eastern European socialist countries and the FRG. On the one hand, closer economic ties with West Germany threatened the "unity of socialist states" (although it also contributed to the erosion of Bonn's "Hallstein Doctrine"). But on the other hand, West Germany remained a problem for the Soviet Union. Not only was Moscow uneasy over the Bonn government's refusal to recognize Poland's western border and its alleged attempts to "destabilize" Czechoslovakia, but the ruling elite in Moscow also felt threatened by the revival of neo-Nazi propaganda and the expansion of right-wing politics. The formation of the National Democratic Party (NPD) in November 1964 and its electoral successes between 1966 and 1968 created consternation in Moscow. There were also the geopolitical factors. West Germany's membership in NATO and the presence of American forces along the Soviet bloc's front line were extremely undesirable. The deployment on FRG territory not only of tactical nuclear missiles but also of ninety-six medium-range warheads raised the stakes of the "German question." Soviet leaders perceived a major military threat from the potential increase of West German forces within NATO and from Bonn's nuclear ambitions.

At the same time, Moscow paid serious attention to the German issue in the context of an all-European Soviet foreign policy. In March 1969, the leaders of the Soviet bloc countries, meeting in Budapest, adopted a declaration on strengthening peace and security in Europe. This document demanded the recognition of all existing borders in Europe and a non-nuclear West Germany. Along with the proposal to simultaneously dissolve both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the Budapest declaration called for a dialogue between Western and Eastern European governments to solve the continent's main problems. Convening an all-European summit on security and cooperation had become a key goal of Moscow's foreign policy. In this context, the German problem might be resolved through mutual recognition of the existence of two German states.

It was Yuri Andropov who seized the initiative in opening a détente with West Germany by proposing a "back channel" with West German leaders. In the early spring of 1969, *Sovetskaya Kultura* sent Valeriy Lednev, a journalist with close connections to the KGB officer Vyacheslav Kevorkov, to Bonn. Lednev's reports confirmed the predictions of an SPD victory in the upcoming federal elections.² At the end of April, Andropov, citing reports from West German political leaders and West German communists, had alerted Brezhnev to the expected change in Bonn's leadership but counseled a wait-and-see policy and advised the general secretary to establish the back channel afterwards.³ Although Moscow avoided the impression of interfering in the West German electoral campaign, it began wooing West German public opinion by announcing a new policy of ending confrontation and seeking a practical dialogue over the future of Europe.⁴

By the summer of 1969 Soviet leaders had left little doubt of their own electoral preferences. In July, they received the Free Democratic (FDP) leaders Walter Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Wolfgang Mischnick in Moscow, and in August they received Social Democratic (SPD) leaders Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. In his conversation with the FDP party chairman Scheel, Gromyko emphasized "the necessity to dig a tunnel in the rock from both sides simultaneously and do it in such manner that both sides will ultimately meet each other."⁵

2 Vyacheslav Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal* [Secret Channel] (Moscow: Geya, 1997), p. 39.

3 Ibid., pp. 40, 42. The decision to send Lednev to Bonn coincided with the meeting of Soviet and Polish party leaders in Moscow, March 3-4, 1969. For more on the shift in Gomulka's policy toward the FRG: Douglas Selva, "The Treaty of Warsaw: The Warsaw Pact Context," in *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute*, Supplement No. 1, pp. 73-75.

4 Valentin Falin, *Bez skidok na obostoyatelstva* [In Spite of Circumstances] (Moscow: Respublika-Sovremennik, 1999), p. 128.

5 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 62.

AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 1969 BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS

When the German election results became known, Soviet leaders expressed their great satisfaction. Brezhnev, speaking at the GDR's twentieth anniversary celebration on October 6, 1969, labeled the SPD-FDP victory "undoubtedly a success on the part of the democratic forces in the FRG." He announced that Moscow "would welcome a turn toward realism in the policy of the FRG and stood ready to respond accordingly."⁶ The impetus for the next Soviet move came from a confidential letter from Brandt on November 19, 1969, to Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin proposing, among other things, the establishment of a special channel for an "exchange of opinions." For Brezhnev and Andropov, this letter served as a clear sign that it was high time to develop relations with the FRG.⁷

Other factors may have influenced Moscow's decision. One was West Germany's announcement on November 28, 1969, that it would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Another was Moscow's determination to control any bilateral contacts about to be initiated between West Germany and the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies.⁸ Thus, at a Politburo session, and before consulting with their Warsaw Pact partners, the Soviet leadership discussed a new policy toward the FRG, and Brezhnev approved a joint memorandum prepared by the Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. This document was the basis of the speech Brezhnev delivered at the Warsaw Pact meeting on December 2 and 3, 1969, in which he divulged his candid impressions and sought his colleagues' responses.⁹

The response to Brandt's confidential letter to Kosygin came from someone who was not addressed. Contrary to standard diplomatic practice, it was Andropov who took action to set up "confidential relations" between Brezhnev and Brandt.¹⁰ As a result of the two meetings between Egon Bahr and the KGB contact Lednev on December 22 and 23, 1969, a direct channel at the very highest level was established. To win Bahr's trust, Lednev had quoted from Brandt's letter to Kosygin, which persuaded Bahr that his

6 "Rech Tovarisha L.I. Brezhneva" [Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev], *Pravda*, October 7, 1969, p. 3.

7 In this letter Brandt had used Gromyko's phrase from his conversation with Scheel in July on the need to drill a hole in the rock from both sides of the mountain. He had also proposed that the exchange of opinions should be strictly confidential. "The task should attract the attention of both governments. It cannot be solved overnight but must be seen as a long-term process" (Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 44).

8 Alexei Filitov, "The Road to the Moscow Treaty of 1970," Conference Paper at The Ohio State University, May 12-13, 2006, pp. 11-12.

9 Falin, *Bez skidok na obshchestvennoye*, pp. 142-43. 10 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 43.

interlocutor had connections with influential people in Moscow. According to Kevorkov, Lednev at once informed Bahr that he represented "Brezhnev and his close and like-minded fellows."¹¹ On December 24, 1969, Bahr replied that Chancellor Brandt would welcome the confidential channel. He considered the main value of such contacts "the chance for frank and direct exchange of opinions without limitation of subjects." In a revealing comment, the West Germans also insisted that, despite any favorable development in the relations between Moscow and Bonn, in critical situations they would almost certainly side with the United States.¹² Brezhnev's immediate reaction was to provide assurance that he neither wished nor intended "to drive a wedge or even hammer an ordinary nail" to move Bonn away from Washington.¹³

The first weeks of 1970 began with a Soviet internal debate over the chief negotiator with Bonn. A crisis in the Soviet leadership now erupted, because Gromyko was offended that Andropov had seized the initiative in dealing with Brandt.¹⁴ By February 1970, a sort of domestic coalition was formed between the Foreign Ministry (Gromyko-Falin) and the KGB (Andropov-Kevorkov), with both backing Brezhnev.¹⁵ Although the Foreign Ministry had lost its exclusive role in directing Soviet policy toward the FRG, Gromyko acquiesced in the creation of a direct channel between Brandt and Brezhnev via the KGB, because it offered the chance to exclude his rival Kosygin. Bowing to pressure from above and to the necessity of negotiating with Bonn, Gromyko remained suspicious of secret diplomacy, especially with the Social Democrats, comparing the moment with a "fruit not yet ripe."¹⁶ On January 21, 1970, the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, Piotr Abrašimov, commented on the "increased attempts by the Bonn government to create a wedge between the Soviet and East German positions towards the FRG."¹⁷ On the other hand, in early February, the KGB passed on the views of the West German Embassy in Moscow on the "current

11 Ibid., pp. 47-48. Later in March 1970 Bahr reported to Brandt on his negotiations with Gromyko in Moscow and with Lednev and Kevorkov: "It is hard to say concretely where they are employed." Bahr's hypothesis was that Kevorkov (whom he knew only by his first name "Slava") was employed by the staff of the general secretary, whereas Lednev had been working under the cover of a journalist from *Literaturnaya Gazeta* to facilitate his visit to Bonn (ibid., p. 303).

12 Ibid., p. 50.

13 Ibid., p. 54.

14 In mid-January Kevorkov had a conversation with Falin, who was skeptical about Gromyko's ability to do something positive on West Germany's behalf. Ibid., p. 56.

15 Brezhnev did not support his foreign minister's taking a position "above the fray." Reportedly, he proposed that Gromyko hold discussions with Andropov to find out "where the keys from Germany are hidden" (ibid., p. 58); on these conversations, ibid., p. 62.

16 Ibid., p. 63.

17 Russian State Archive for Modern History (RGANI) E5 Op.62 D.35 L.15-16. From Berlin (Abrašimov) to Comrades A.A. Gromyko and V.M. Falin. January 21, 1970. According to notations in

prospects of normalizing relations." Underscoring this point, Andropov emphasized that the new FRG leadership had "demonstrated its positive intentions by refraining from criticizing Lenin on his 100th birthday."¹⁸

During the first stage of Bahr's negotiations in Moscow, the German side attempted to contact Kosygin, and there was a meeting on February 13, 1970.¹⁹ However, the premier was gradually excluded, even though Kosygin closely followed the talks with Bahr as well as the final stages of the negotiations with the Bonn delegation headed by Scheel. In the meantime, Brezhnev became more and more involved in the discussions. Both Falin, the senior diplomat in the Soviet Foreign Ministry who was responsible for FRG affairs, and Andropov were working directly with Brezhnev to overcome Gromyko's objections. Brezhnev strongly approved of creating a restricted group of negotiators with Bonn, which was in place by early 1970; indeed, he blocked West German attempts to broaden these channels, which would have enabled Podgorny to become involved.

Even the exposure of Bahr's activities in Moscow by the West German media did not spoil the constructive atmosphere promoted by the party general secretary. Brezhnev continued to pressure Gromyko to soften his approach.²⁰ Bahr, in his discussions with Falin on May 20, urged the Soviets to make concessions in order to strengthen his and Brandt's position vis-à-vis their SPD-FDP coalition partners, the CDU opposition, and the three allied Western powers.²¹ Thereupon Brezhnev on July 12, 1970, attempted to bolster his new West German partners. In a campaign speech at an electoral gathering prior to the Supreme Soviet election, he outlined the prospects for improved bilateral relations between Moscow and Bonn. Referring to the talks with Bahr, he announced: "We consider this exchange of views as useful and from our side we are ready to continue negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion."²²

FROM SIGNATURE TO RATIFICATION

Brezhnev and his entourage used the signing ceremony of the Soviet-FRG Treaty on August 12, 1970 to promote the party secretary's achievement. The official photographs of the occasion, published on the front pages of the principal newspapers, were aimed at convincing the public that it was

the margins, this message circulated among members and candidates of members of the Soviet Politburo.

18 RGANI. F5 Op.62. D.35 L.19. Chairman of the KGB Andropov to the CC CPSU. February 3, 1970.

19 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, pp. 68, 74-75. 20 Ibid., p. 77.

21 Filitov, "The Road to the Moscow Treaty," p. 18.

22 Quoted in Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 78.

Brezhnev who had succeeded in establishing closer relations with West Germany, thereby diminishing Kosygin's role and influence.²³ This event was not only a personal triumph for Brezhnev. The treaty also confirmed the Soviets' predominance in the socialist camp and bolstered the "Brezhnev Doctrine."²⁴

On the very day of the signing the treaty, Brezhnev received disquieting news from communist party sources. Throughout the Soviet Union, and particularly in Smolensk, Belorussia, and in the Urals region, the population were stocking up on essentials (salt, soap, and matches) and were comparing the Moscow Treaty with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.²⁵ A special letter of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU was circulated throughout the country. According to official reports, the new situation had become the subject of lively discussions among communist party members as well as the nonaffiliated population. The Special Department of the CC CPSU dealing with party organizational matters, and headed by Brezhnev's close friend Konstantin Chernenko, worked intensively to direct internal propaganda in order to convince party members and the population of the correctness of Brezhnev's line.

By October 1970, the reports from all regions were studied and summarized. Despite the government's forceful propaganda efforts and the work of hundreds of communists in every region, the general mood toward the treaty remained mixed. The communiqués reported heated arguments for and against the signing, revealing old and new phobias (such as "a diplomatic maneuver by the FRG leadership . . . to mask its revanchist intentions") along with more measured responses.²⁶

Brezhnev had anticipated the opposition. Speaking to the Warsaw Pact leaders on August 20, 1970, he announced that the Soviet Union had struck a deal favorable to its interests and to those of the socialist camp. The process had been difficult because of West Germany's insistence on maintaining its reservations over the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border and over international recognition of the GDR. He praised the treaty for achieving the goal that the USSR had pursued for two decades, thereby comparing himself, intentionally or unintentionally, with Stalin and Khrushchev, who had failed to accomplish this. It was therefore Brezhnev who had confirmed

23 Ibid., pp. 80-81.

24 Filitov, "The Road to the Moscow Treaty," p. 20.

25 Falin, *Bez skidok na obstoystelstva*, pp. 196-97.

26 RGANI, F5. Op.62 D.15 L. 75-76. Information for Communists on the Letter of the CC CPSU, "On the Treaty between the USSR and the FRG," Deputy Chief of Department of Organization CR KPSS I. Petrovichev, October 1, 1970.

"the results of anti-fascist struggle for the liberation of peoples in World War II as they had been fixed in the Potsdam Agreements, had strengthened socialism in Europe, and had stabilized the security of European peoples." He assured his colleagues that the border question, the "pivotal political core of this package agreement," had been solved "in accordance with our common position." However, it was also true that the somewhat vague formulation in the treaty of Poland's western border and the intra-German border had increased Moscow's power over its two vulnerable allies.²⁷

In his speech Brezhnev suggested that despite the "ideological and programmatic differences" between communists and social democrats, there were possible areas of cooperation – especially with socialist parties in power – "in the pursuit of peace and promoting European security." Such cooperation might "influence developments within other Western social democratic parties by strengthening the positions of leftist forces." At the same time, he assured his colleagues that the Soviet leadership was alert to the menacing "attempts by the social democrats to influence the communist movement, the socialist countries, and communist parties," and announced that "vigilance towards bourgeois and social democratic ideology [was] still necessary." On the other hand, the Soviet leader emphasized the need to refrain from complicating Brandt's position and delivering arguments to the "Strauss group and other right-wing forces" in the FRG. By establishing this propaganda direction, the Soviet bloc would "arouse positive feelings toward the socialist countries among the public of the capitalist world." However, this did not exclude the necessity of sharply "unmasking slanderers and double-dealing agents" attempting "to torpedo the Treaty."²⁸

After Brandt's departure from Moscow on August 13, 1970, Soviet diplomats began studying the prospects of expanding bilateral relations. At once, they received reports of Scheel's concern that the treaty had moved too far ahead of West German public opinion and might create problems for the governing coalition. Reporting to Gromyko, Falin recommended taking concrete steps to improve relations even before the ratification of the treaty. One proposal was a reconsideration of Soviet military doctrine in Europe, which Kosygin supported. Gromyko endorsed Falin's suggestion, but also emphasized the need "not to erode the Soviet position by supplying the CDU and CSU with the argument that normal relations [were] possible

without creating a legal basis of bilateral relations." Thus, the idea of arms reduction in Europe was placed on hold.²⁹

West Germany tried to enlist its new Soviet partner in solving its problems. In September 1970, Horst Ehmke, the director of the Bonn Chancellery, brought up the complications that had been raised by the "strong request" of the USSR and the other socialist countries to end the activity of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and by their threats to boycott the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. Although Ehmke hinted that this pressure might strengthen Bonn's negotiating position vis-à-vis Washington when discussing the problem of technical licenses for these stations, he also indicated that his government was "afraid to provoke American displeasure" and therefore asked to postpone a solution until after the summer games.³⁰

Both sides had an effect on each other's internal balance of forces. Not only did Moscow's statements and behavior affect German politics, but also the threats of the CDU and CSU to use the ratification process to topple the Social-Liberal government endangered the power position of Brezhnev and Andropov.³¹ During the first months of 1971, the direct back channel between Brezhnev and Brandt worked at full strength. Intimate cooperation reached such a level that Brezhnev asked Brandt what phrases he should incorporate in his speeches to increase popular support for the West German chancellor.³² Brezhnev and his lieutenants were also concerned about U.S. obstruction of Brandt's policies. In a conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador Veljko Micunović on February 4, 1971, the Soviet leader insisted that the resolutions at the NATO meeting in December 1970 were aimed at curtailing positive developments in Europe. According to Brezhnev, the United States, relying on the strong West German opposition, was intending to block the creation of a new situation in order to impose its will on Europe. Although Brandt's party program was not entirely acceptable, it was essential to support the Social-Liberal government.

Growing more expansive with the Yugoslav ambassador, Brezhnev provided details about the USSR's European policy, which included large-scale projects for gas pipelines from Siberia to West Germany, Italy, Austria, and France. With an increased supply of Soviet gas, oil, and other raw materials, Western Europe would experience important economic changes.

27 Filitov, "The Road to the Moscow Treaty," p. 20.

28 Modern Records Archive, Warsaw, (AAN) KC PZPR, XIA/106, k. 87–105. Moscow, August 20, 1970 (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_3/PCC_texts/ed_note_70A.htm).

29 Falin, *Bez skidok na obshchitel'stvo*, pp. 194–95.

30 RGANI. Op.5. Op.62. D.43. L. 222–223. Deputy Chairman of the KGB Chebrikov to the CC CPSU, October 22, 1970.

31 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanala*, p. 83.

32 Ibid., pp. 83–84.

According to Mićunović, Brezhnev asserted, "the USSR is a country that can guarantee all this." The Soviet general secretary envisioned historic changes that would create for the first time a "long-term material foundation" and a "physical basis" for a lasting peace in Europe.³³

Brezhnev linked his support to Brandt with veiled threats. On March 30, 1971, in his report to the twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, he warned that "realist thinking circles in Bonn and other Western European capitals should recognize the simple reality that a delay in ratification [would] give rise to a new crisis of confidence in Soviet policy towards the FRG. It [would] worsen the political climate in Europe and the prospects for relaxation of international tensions."³⁴

Brandt created another obstacle. The chancellor supported the CSU/CDU's demands to link the ratification of the treaties with the USSR and Poland with a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin. Moscow reluctantly agreed. Falin, who went to Bonn in May 1971 as Soviet ambassador, handled this task; and after a few months of talks with the U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Rush the draft was ready.³⁵ Brezhnev nonetheless distrusted the United States. In August 1971, he repeated his suspicions that Washington was obstructing the process of European détente by linking the West Berlin issue with ratification of the treaties. Brezhnev praised Chancellor Brandt for his efforts to reach a Berlin agreement, which he related to Bonn's activity for détente in Europe.³⁶ Indeed, the Soviet qualms about the United States still seemed valid; despite the successful conclusion of the quadripartite pact, the conservative FRG opposition was still reluctant to make even a small step toward ratification. ✓

The ensuing delay was deeply depressing to Brezhnev and weakened his position along with that of Andropov and Gromyko within the Soviet Politburo. Those who had kept silent during the earlier foreign policy debates now began to express doubts and to criticize the "nonclass-based approach" to Soviet diplomacy. The situation required new steps to boost Brezhnev's authority.³⁷

non - class - based approach

33 Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine 1969/1971* [Moscow Years, 1969/71] (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Revija, 1984), pp. 120–21.

34 Report by General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. Brezhnev. *Pravda*, March 31, 1971.

35 Soviet sources on the Berlin agreement: Falin, *Bez skidok na obzoyatelstva*, pp. 198–224, 229–46; also *Chetyrehstoronnee soglaseniye po Zapadnomu Berlinu i yego realizatsiya, 1971–1977 gg. Dokumenty* [The Quadripartite Agreement on Western Berlin and its Implementation, 1971–1977. Documents] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977).

36 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine 1969/1971*, p. 138.

37 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, pp. 94–95.

PLUMBING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OREANDA MEETING

The most appropriate solution was to organize a private meeting between Brezhnev and Brandt in the Crimea. The place was chosen intentionally to exclude Kosygin, because the head of the Soviet government spent his vacations in the Caucasus. Falin's efforts to include the premier led to his own removal from the last stages of the summit preparations. Brezhnev also barred Falin from participation in the Crimea under the pretext that otherwise the German ambassador would have to take part.³⁸ Between September 16 and 18, 1971, the so-called informal meeting was held in Oreanda. The range of issues under discussion included the ratification of the treaties, relations between the FRG and the GDR, and preparations for the ESC, which Brezhnev still warmly supported because of its global significance.³⁹ Both leaders agreed to establish a bilateral commission on economic and scientific-technical cooperation.⁴⁰ The main goal of this meeting was the wish of both sides to get to know each other better.⁴¹ Brezhnev's more immediate purpose was to lay the foundations for his trip to West Germany, the first official visit ever by a Soviet leader.⁴² ESC

The fact that no internal bulletins were released on the Oreanda meeting was characteristic in itself. This time Brezhnev did not want to focus the attention of the Communist Party membership on his relations with Brandt. Nonetheless, the summit was discussed at regional party meetings. During these sessions, Soviet foreign policy was presented not as the general secretary's exclusive domain but as the "the most important international activity undertaken by the CC of the CPSU." The intraparty discussions were predictably triumphalist and unproductive. The improved relationship between the USSR and the FRG had allegedly provided evidence of the "bankruptcy of the Cold War policy of reactionary circles." However, despite all the boasts during these briefings, there were insistent questions from below: "Why is the Treaty between the USSR and the FRG not yet ratified?" "Can we expect that the meeting between Brezhnev and Brandt

38 Falin, *Bez skidok na obzoyatelstva*, pp. 247, 252.

39 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, pp. 95, 97–98. Alexandrov-Agentov, assistant on international affairs to the CPSU general secretary, also stressed the importance that Brezhnev assigned to the idea of a pan-European conference: Alexander Alexandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva* [From Kollontai to Gorbachev] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 1994), p. 190.

40 Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). E757. Op.17. Por.15. Papka 98. List 7. "Otnosheniya SSSR s FRG" [Relations of the USSR with the FRG]. Undated (drafted between October and December 1972 in the 3rd European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry).

41 Alexandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, p. 188.

42 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 95.

will accelerate the ratification?"⁴³ "Is it possible that the FRG government has the same goals that the leaders of the Third Reich pursued before World War II?" "Is there any chance that the negotiations between the USSR and the FRG will infringe on the interests of the GDR?" "What are the reasons for the insufficient coverage by the Soviet press of the activity of the FRG government and of economic developments inside Western Germany?"⁴⁴

The reports from the local CPSU organizations demonstrated that the fears harbored in 1970 had not disappeared. Internal bulletins on Soviet public opinion went as follows: "Of course, the recent agreements concluded with the FRG 'boost spirits and raise confidence in the world of tomorrow.'" Nevertheless it was important "to be cautious in evaluating FRG policy." It was no secret that "certain FRG industrial circles [were establishing] close business ties with China and with Israel and supplying our political opponents with modern armaments. Our ideological workers should be especially vigilant, and fight the good fight against bourgeois ideology."⁴⁵

Brezhnev's course of action toward Brandt's *Ostpolitik* came under indirect criticism at the Soviet Politburo meeting on October 14, 1971. In reporting on his visit to the GDR, the Ukrainian leader [Piotr Shelest] mentioned the East Germans' grievances against Brandt. Shelest stated that both the new (Honecker) and old (Ulbricht and Stoph) leadership were united in their mistrust. Shelest also raised the matter of a letter sent by Honecker to the Soviet leaders, which had mysteriously "disappeared," because Brezhnev had not distributed it to other Politburo members. According to Shelest, after his remarks "Brezhnev was in fog."⁴⁶

During the first half of 1972, the main Soviet efforts toward Europe were focused on assisting Willy Brandt. Moscow closely followed the Bundestag debates and was concerned that a vote of no confidence might topple the coalition government.⁴⁷ On March 5, 1972, Brezhnev told Gromyko that

43 RGANI. F5.Op.63.D.59 lists 4-5. 2 October 1971. Secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian CP I. Lutak, Information on the comments by the working population of the Ukrainian SSR during the visits of the general secretary of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, to Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and on his meeting with the Federal Chancellor of the FRG, W. Brandt, in the Crimea.

44 RGANI. F5.Op.63.D.59 list 9-10. October 5, 1971. Secretary of the Moscow Committee Konotop, Information on the comments of the working population of the Moscow region on the most important activities in international sphere conducted by the CC of the CPSU.

45 Ibid., list 7.

46 Petr Shelest, ... *Da ne sudimy budete. Dnevnikovye zapisi, vospominaniya chlena Politbuiuro TsK KPSS*. [... Judged. Diaries and memoirs of a member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU] (Moscow: Edition Q, 1995), pp. 488-89.

47 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 103.

he intended to help Brandt by devoting two paragraphs in his forthcoming speech to the Soviet trade unions congress to the ratification problem. Gromyko suggested that he also clarify the Soviet approach toward the Common Market, to deflect the German opposition's charges that Moscow intended to tear the FRG away from Western Europe.⁴⁸ On March 9, 1972, the Soviet Politburo approved these "arguments" on behalf of Brandt, and Soviet Ambassador Falin was assigned to pass them to the chancellor at his discretion.⁴⁹ On March 20, 1972, Moscow sent two major signals. A large group of Soviet citizens of German origin who had applied to settle in the FRG were granted the right to emigrate.⁵⁰ That same day, in his speech to the trade unions congress, Brezhnev framed the ratification issue as a choice between "cooperation or confrontation, détente or fomenting tension, a policy of peace or policy of war."⁵¹

In early April 1972, the Soviet leadership learned that Brandt had asked the Socialist International to support his *Ostpolitik*. The Soviet media added their endorsement.⁵² On April 19, 1972, the first session of the bilateral commission on economic and scientific-technical matters took place and was touted as a result of negotiations in Oreanda. To facilitate treaty ratification, the Soviet secret services were even ready to supply Brandt's entourage with large sums of money to bribe a certain number of CDU/CSU deputies after rumors circulated that the conservative opposition had convinced several parliamentarians from the government coalition to vote against Brandt. Ivan Fadeykin, the Soviet KGB station chief in the GDR, collected \$1 million for this purpose; and reportedly, Andropov personally approved the operation.⁵³

During the Bundestag debate over ratification, Brezhnev was "in a very tense mood," smoking nervously and frequently asking his aides for news from Bonn. At stake were not only his German policy but also his foreign policy in general. The Soviet leader had made preparations for Richard Nixon's Moscow visit, and without ratification in Bonn, Brezhnev's negotiating position with the U.S. president would have been compromised.⁵⁴

48 Anatoly Chernyaev, *Na Staroi ploshchadi. Iz dnevnikovih zapisei. 1973 god.* [On Old Square. From my diaries] (Moscow: Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, No. 6, 2004), p. 119.

49 Ibid., p. 120.

50 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, p. 103.

51 "Resheniya XXIV s'ezda KPSS – boievaya programma deyatel'nosti sovetskikh profsoyuzov. Rech tovarisha L.I. Brezhneva" [The decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress – militant program of activity for Soviet trade unions]. *Pravda*, March 21, 1972, p. 2.

52 One of the CPSU secretaries, Katushev, even recommended that his subordinates write articles in the newspaper *Pravda* complimenting the German Social Democrats (Chernyaev, *Na Staroi ploshchadi*, p. 122).

53 Kevorkov, *Tainy Kanal*, pp. 103-15.

54 A. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, p. 186.

Indeed, Brezhnev's fears were so strong that he was prepared to recall his long-term confidant, Ambassador Falin, from his duties in Bonn. In April and May 1972, Falin worked assiduously to assist the SPD-FDP government wherever he could. Ultimately, Brandt prevailed both over the no-confidence motion and the domestic opponents of *Ostpolitik*, and the Bundestag ratified the Eastern Treaties on May 17, 1972.⁵⁵

Moscow's next moves were laid out in the position paper approved by the Soviet leadership on August 20, 1972, "On some steps towards the FRG in the context of implementing the Treaty of August 12 1970."⁵⁶ Some of these projects were immediately implemented. In September 1972 the first session of the working group of the Bilateral Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation was held. During the consultations with Bahr in Moscow in October, other matters pertaining to expanded economic cooperation were discussed, and an agreement to exchange military attachés was reached. On November 1, 1972, an FRG general consulate was opened in Leningrad.⁵⁷

Events seemed to be moving in a positive direction. On November 19, 1972, the Social-Liberal coalition achieved an impressive victory in the federal elections, with Brandt's Social Democrats winning a record number of votes in the largest turnout ever in West German history. The Soviet media commented favorably on the results.⁵⁸ In fact, Bahr's consultations in Moscow in October 1972 were one of the last positive episodes in Soviet-FRG bilateral relations.

By the end of 1972, the Soviet political elite were displaying growing distrust and dissatisfaction over developments within the FRG and with their bilateral relations. The Brandt government was loyally observing the terms of the treaty and taking pains to avoid irritating Moscow; but the CDU/CSU opposition was now insisting on its version of the special resolution on German unity. From the Soviet perspective, this

55 Falin, *Bez skidok na obshchayatelstva*, pp. 260–66.

56 The whole document is still classified. At the moment only part of it is available to researchers because it is mentioned in a later document, which quotes from the Politburo decision of August 20, 1970. According to it, Soviet propaganda machinery had been responsible for promoting Soviet ideological influence in the FRG. Among other measures, articles criticizing the ideological concepts of the SPD and unmasking its anti-Marxist character and anticommunist trends were commissioned for publication (RGANI. F5. Op.66. D.161. lists 10–11. Deputy-director of Information Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, L. Maksudov to the CC CPSU. February 15, 1973).

57 AVP R.F. E757. Op.17. Por.15. Papka 98. Lists. 1–10. Relations of the USSR with the FRG. Undated, composed between October and December 1972 in the 3d European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

58 Yevgenij Grigoriev, "Success of a Realistic Course," *Pravda*, November 21, 1972, p. 5; idem., "When the Horizon Has Brightened," *Pravda*, November 21, 1972, p. 5.

clamor threatened to revive a one-sided West German view on self-determination, on existing borders in Europe, and on other important questions.⁵⁹

SOVIET REEVALUATIONS IN EARLY 1973

The situation continued to deteriorate. During the Bundestag debate in January 1973 over the new governmental declaration, the conservative opposition drew attention to the resolution of May 17, 1972, with the intention of endowing it with "international legal significance." Falin reported a division between the SPD caucus leader Herbert Wehner, who was supported by Scheel, and Chancellor Brandt. According to the Soviet ambassador, Brandt, who was now acting not as the leader of the Social Democrats but as a bipartisan statesman, was, in fact, moving closer to the CDU/CSU position. The powerful Brandt-Wehner collaboration had been ruptured.⁶⁰ The fact that Wehner was a renegade communist⁶¹ did little to convince Moscow to remain a partner of the German Social Democrats. Brezhnev's expectations in August 1970 of a split within the SPD and a rise in popularity of its radical left wing had failed to materialize. Now the hard-line formulation of the "Suslov group" (promoted by the head of the International Department of the CC of the CPSU, Boris Ponomarev and others), which had been suppressed by Brezhnev in late 1969 and 1970, was once more on the rise. Moreover, to gain political support for the Soviet-American agreements in 1971 and 1972, Brezhnev and Kosygin were now forced to adopt the priorities of the senior ideologists Suslov and Podgorniy, both of whom had been skeptical about détente.⁶²

During the first weeks of 1973, the Soviet Foreign Ministry conducted a reappraisal of Brandt's policy and produced a memorandum based on information provided by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn.⁶³ After ritualized praise of Soviet foreign policy for having created a markedly positive turn in the mindset of West German society, the memorandum announced that

59 AVP R.F. E757. Op.17. Por.15. Papka 98. Lists. 5. Relations of the USSR with the FRG. Soviet Foreign Ministry. 3rd European Department. Undated, probably composed between October and December 1972.

60 Falin, *Bez skidok na obshchayatelstva*, pp. 272–73. 61 Chernyaev, *Na Staroi ploshchadi*, p. 92.

62 Richard D. Anderson, *Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy during the Brezhnev Years* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 217.

63 RGANI. F5. Op.66. D.161. Lists 10–11. "On the strengthening of the influence of West German Social Democracy and the need to implement further informational propaganda activity toward the FRG. Deputy Director of Information Department of Soviet Foreign Ministry, L. Maksudov to CC CPSU. February 15, 1973.

the reactionary forces had not been defeated. A united group of neo-Nazis and "revanchist elements" had voted for the conservative opposition, which had largely adopted their right-wing ideology. The memorandum faintly praised the SPD, admitting that its message appealed to a larger public than the West German Communist Party. Nonetheless, the Soviet side was irritated by Brandt's party, which "tried to represent itself as the party of social progress and social reforms in the interest of all strata of the population while at the same time holding firmly to the position of defending private property and the 'social market economy.'"

This memorandum revealed the ~~traditional communist distrust toward Social Democracy~~ despite the latter's recent innovations. Yet it also admitted that West Germany's governing coalition had been victorious because a majority of West Germans believed that *Ostpolitik* would draw the FRG and the GDR closer together, reestablish family ties, and mitigate the difficulties of Germany's division. Although the SPD's unbridled anti-Sovietism and anticommunism had slightly receded, it could still spread poison in West German minds. The memorandum thus predicted, "The FRG's Social Democrats will try to intensify the ideological struggle against communism and attempt to penetrate the GDR and destabilize its political and ideological foundations." The Soviets' task, in addition to combating reactionary forces inside the FRG, was to conduct an "aggressive struggle against the social democratic ideology, to dissociate from it, and to unmask it."⁶⁴

It was obvious that the Soviet shift in 1973 was not only due to ideological differences. Moscow was also influenced by the suspicious and negative reactions to Brandt by the chiefs of the GDR. According to Falin, as early as October 1971 the Soviet leaders were aware of Honecker's differences with the Warsaw Pact dating back to December 1969. Falin, the author of the softer approach to Bonn, pointed to Honecker's "irrational nationalism" and noted on several occasions that the East German leader hoped to free the GDR from an over dependence on Moscow. A special report by KGB experts confirmed this analysis; the conclusions were so gloomy that it was shown only to Brezhnev.⁶⁵

On March 12, 1973, Falin shared his views during an informal conversation with Anatoly Chernyaev, a more liberal thinking official in the International Department of the CC CPSU. For Falin it was clear that the Soviet-bloc countries had lost the initiative on the question of German unification. Only Brandt had the vision to solve the national problem. Ulbricht's had been a utopian concept of a unified socialist Germany, whereas

Honecker had no concept at all. He simply "sails down the river" encircled by his lieutenants who intend to dominate him.

Falin was skeptical about the future of Soviet-GDR relations. On the one hand, the GDR leaders displayed strong support for Moscow's proposed integration of the socialist countries (while knowing in advance that this was unacceptable to them). On the other, they were organizing small provocations against Brandt's policy regarding the status of journalists and family reunification (especially children) and were inciting hatred of Brandt among the East German population. Falin also discussed the active economic ties, virtually unknown to the Soviets, and the powerful if ~~invisible exchanges~~ by both sides, comparing them to the ~~"substrata that ultimately create the life of the ocean."~~ These now included exchanges between trade unions; scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges; family ties; and top-secret interparty links. Falin also referred to dozens, and even hundreds, of emissaries who were traveling between both sides on special missions, and he was highly critical of the East German leadership: ~~"They are only pretending to be our most 'devoted friends'."~~ According to Falin, the West Germans had proposed projects to the GDR involving full branch-production integration, knowing very well that the USSR was not in a position to match their "brave internationalist projects." In comparison, the GDR leadership, which had rejected the Soviet system of industrial standards, was avidly applying itself to the West German/Common Market system of standards. The ambassador added ironically: "So much for integration." In conclusion, Falin advised Chernyaev to think seriously about the "concept of Germany." If "we do not, in five years we shall have changes in the GDR that will exceed the capacity of our occupation forces."⁶⁶

In later years, the assessments of the GDR by Andropov himself were even gloomier than Falin's.⁶⁷ At the same time, the problem of German-German relations continued to engage rank-and-file communists. In the fall of 1973 a frequently discussed question was "How real is the threat of economic and ideological penetration of the FRG into the GDR after the normalization of relations between them?"⁶⁸

In April 1973, Brezhnev presented a report to a CC session drafted by experts from liberal academic think tanks. This did not, however, mean that the general secretary intended to put their proposals into practice.

66 Chernyaev, *Na Staroi ploshchadi*, p. 91.

67 Falin, *Bez skidok na obshchestvo*, p. 257. Falin was also critical of the West German Communist Party. Complete lists of its membership and financial connections had fallen into the hands of FRG Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

68 RGANI. F5. Op.66. D.160. L.100-101. G. Smirnov, "On the nature of the questions received by lecturers of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPSU in October-November 1973."

Brezhnev used this document to justify his previous foreign policy instead of promoting a new vision. However, Brandt was still characterized as a partner, an "anti-fascist who had fled from Hitler's Germany and returned as a uniformed officer of the Norwegian army." His election had signified a "psychological turning point" in the history of the FRG,⁶⁹ and Brezhnev's upcoming visit to the FRG would define their "long-term" friendship and cooperation.⁷⁰

Despite these inventive slogans, Brezhnev did nothing to implement them. According to the limited information available on Brezhnev's visit to the FRG between May 18 and 22, 1973, there were no breakthroughs or any new ideas. In their memoirs, Soviet authorities recalled such minor details as Brezhnev's driving the car that Brandt had given him as a present and that he was accompanied by an aide with an injured hand in order to remind Brandt of World War II.⁷¹ West German industrialists were "struck by Brezhnev's impatience with their slowness in promoting large-scale projects in Siberia."⁷² The Soviet Embassy's commentary on the German media coverage took considerable time to prepare.⁷³

In late July 1973, during the Crimea meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders, Brezhnev shared his views of his May conversations with Brandt. The absence of significant progress in their bilateral relations stirred Brezhnev to inflate even more: "Without unnecessary modesty, you and we, Comrades, can rightfully say that we have advanced significantly in the realization of our common line concerning our international interests." According to Brezhnev, "the main thing we have achieved as a result of our common policy toward the FRG, [is] that the West German government and the great majority of its people have basically acknowledged the impossibility of altering the results of the Second World War. The Germany that attempted to dominate Europe and the whole world does not exist today. If we act as we did up to now, actively and in solidarity, it will never exist again."⁷⁴

69 This formula was a response to doubts toward Brandt, expressed by Brezhnev after his private meetings with him in Oreanda when he stated that the "political face of Brandt is not exactly clear" (Shelest, *Da ne sudimy budete*, p. 485).

70 Chernyaev, *Na Staroi ploshchadi*, p. 97.

71 Alexandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, p. 192.

72 Volker R. Berghahn, "Lowering Soviet Expectations: West German Industry and Osthandel during the Brandt Era," in *Quest for Economic Empire. European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Volker R. Berghahn (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996), p. 156.

73 RGANI. F5.Op.66. d.166. Lists 232-246. Review of comments of the bourgeois West German press on the visit of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev to the FRG. July 2, 1973.

74 Central State Archive, Sofia. Fond 1-B. Record 35, File 4300. Report of the Secretary General of the CC CPSU at the Warsaw Pact Leaders' Meeting in the Crimea. July 30, 1973. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_16/docs/1_Crimea_1.pdf.

The results of the Crimea meeting were extremely limited, probably because the Soviet Politburo was becoming alarmed over the situation in the socialist camp.⁷⁵ Each of the socialist countries was experiencing economic difficulties and incurring huge foreign currency debts to the West. Especially alarming was the moral and political condition of the GDR. As Chernyaev remembered, "the GDR was simply shocked by the 'peaceful advance' of Brandt who had become a national hero and the symbol of national unity." The opening of the borders for West Germans to visit East Germany had led to mass requests by the GDR population to travel to the FRG. Chernyaev stated, incorrectly, that the denials of such requests had led to open protests. East Germans were rejecting high positions if they were not allowed to visit the FRG, and the Communist Party was allegedly losing members for the same reason.⁷⁶

The Soviet leadership was hindered from expanding its relations with Bonn by its dogmatic communist approaches combined with the heritage of a bloody past and the inertia of its large bureaucracy. Even after Brezhnev and his coalition gained control over the Politburo in the spring of 1973, all the "new impulses" had evaporated. The onset of his illness provided Brezhnev with an excuse for caution and inactivity. By 1974, cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in different spheres had failed to build a solid enough foundation to enable both sides to hope for changes in the future.

Only of limited significance were the tourist exchanges. Soviet Foreign Ministry documents from late 1972 provide some general information about the increased bilateral cooperation in this area. In 1971, some 80,000 tourists from the FRG visited the USSR via the Soviet agency Intourist and 34,000 Soviet citizens visited the FRG.⁷⁷

The problem of emigration by Soviet citizens of German ancestry had emerged earlier. Although the numbers, in proportion to the overall Soviet population, were not significant, the political and symbolic character was important. In the context of the more complex and vocal matter of Jewish emigration during the same period, this problem added to the vulnerability of the Soviet leadership. The two ministries (Interior and KGB) in charge of tourist exchanges dealt with the emigration question in a traditional manner (although their references to Western countries had been altered

75 Chernyaev, probably by mistake, pointed out that the documents were distributed by the general secretary of the CC CPSU Katushev on August 4. See Chernyaev, *Na Staroi ploshchadi*, p. 112.

76 Ibid.

77 AVP RF E757. Op.17. Por.15. Papka 98. Lists 9-10. Information Bulletin, "Relations of the USSR with the FRG." Soviet Foreign Ministry, 3rd European Department. Undated, written between October and December 1972.

from "enemy" [*vrag*] to "adversary" [*protivnik*]). This problem created a constant headache for Soviet leaders during the early 1970s, as the number of citizens wishing to leave the USSR constantly increased.⁷⁸ In 1970 about 2,000 people of "German nationality" applied, and by 1972 the number had increased to 5,000. Only 2,247 people received exit permits, and 1,664 applications were rejected because of "state security interests" or because they had "no relatives in the FRG." During the first half of 1973, of 3,808 applications under review only 1,050 were permitted to leave. In April 1973, a joint appeal was forwarded to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR containing a list of 6,000 German families (a total of 35,000 individuals).

KGB chief Yuri Andropov and Interior Minister N. Shelokov produced a joint memorandum for the Politburo detailing the "organized activity by parties intending to emigrate who have founded 'national committees' and disseminated among the Germans a 'broad movement' for emigration to the FRG." The authors hinted at the existence of "extremists" who were "provoking a certain part of the German population to embrace anti-social actions." They denounced the "subversive activity of the West German Red Cross, Radio *Deutsche Welle*, the reactionary media, religious and charitable organizations, and tourists from the FRG," who were helping to create "an emigration atmosphere." They were also convinced that

officials from the FRG Embassy in Moscow and the General Consulate in Leningrad [were] actively participating in nationalistic manipulations and stirring the desire to emigrate among Soviet Germans. They were conducting an ideological brainwashing of their visitors of German origin, recommending that they apply for departure to the FRG, and pursuing their goal by all means including appeals to Communist party and official Soviet organs as well as to international organizations.

Both chiefs reported that the "organs of the KGB and Interior Ministry were conducting the necessary work to restrain this anti-social activity of elements who tend toward extremism."⁷⁹

Soviet-West German trade and economic relations had been regulated by the general agreement of April 25, 1958, and by the long-term agreement

78 The Soviet Foreign Ministry noted that the FRG "pays significant attention to the emigration of persons of German nationality from socialist countries. These questions arise chronically during the negotiations with representatives of socialist countries. In many cases, the West German government tries to link matters of further developments in other areas to the solution of this question" (AVP RE Fond. 757. Opis 19. Por. 31. Papka 107. L.124. "On the relations of the FRG with the Eastern European Socialist Countries." Soviet Foreign Ministry, 3rd European Department, 1st Secretary P. Smidovich, July 19, 1974).

79 RGANI. E5. Op.66. D.105. Lists 4-5. Yu. Andropov (KGB), N. Shelokov (Interior Ministry), to CC CPSU, October 12, 1973.

on trade and economic cooperation signed on July 5, 1972.⁸⁰ Whereas the 1958 agreement had regulated the "basic trade, political, and juridical conditions of trade between both states," the 1972 one "envisaged the creation of more favorable conditions for the development of trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the FRG, and the creation of a structure of trade exchange." Among the examples of successful cooperation and long-term contracts, the Soviet side signed agreements in February 1970 and July 1972 to supply the FRG for twenty years, beginning on October 10, 1973, with 120 billion cubic meters of gas in exchange for wide-diameter pipes, machines, and equipment for the construction of cross-country gas pipelines. A number of major West German companies and banks opened offices in Moscow, and a Soviet bank (Ost-Westbank) was opened in Frankfurt am Main.⁸¹

But by July 1973, Brezhnev conceded the unsatisfactory status of Soviet proposals "to organize large-scale, long-term cooperation in the economic sphere between the USSR and the FRG." He admitted that "many firms in the FRG are still cautious, doubting that their own resources would be sufficient to realize ambitious plans." Characteristically, he explained the situation not through an ideological analysis but by invoking such practical realities as the FRG's ties with the Common Market and the incompatibility of the two economic systems.⁸²

Brezhnev's complaints about the hesitations of West German firms were more or less tactical. The leading Soviet experts had already acknowledged the limited prospect of expanding economic relations with the West. In the early 1970s, the share of imports from Western countries was less than one percent of the Soviet GNP. Even under ideal circumstances, by 1990, "considering the scale and intensity of Soviet ties with Comecon countries," the share of imports from Western countries was not expected to rise above "two percent of GNP." Western technology was not expected to have a major impact on Soviet industry.⁸³ And, despite Falin's active lobbying, it was not only bureaucratic inertia that prevented greater trade between the

80 AVP RE E757. Op.17. Por.15. Papka 98. Lists 6-9. "Relations of the USSR with the FRG," 3rd European Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, between October and December 1972.

81 Ibid.

82 Report of the general secretary of the CC CPSU at the Warsaw Pact Leaders' Meeting in the Crimea, July 30, 1973. Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 35, File 4300. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_16/docs/1_Crimea_1.pdf.

83 RGANI. E5. Op.66. D.207. List 20. Prospects for the development of foreign economic ties of the USSR with the socialist countries until 1990. Consolidated Report, Section IV. Possibilities to utilize cooperation with developed capitalist and developing countries to solve common tasks of the economies of socialist countries. Moscow, 1973.

FRG and the USSR but also a Soviet sense of superiority, particularly in the nuclear industry.⁸⁴

In sum, during the early 1970s, scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the FRG did not create a solid base for their bilateral relations. Only initial steps were made. The inflexibility of Comecon and the preference for Western firms with existing political relations with the Soviet Union (such as Italy and France) were solid barriers against a rapid breakthrough. These obstacles existed even in spheres where cooperation with the FRG would have greatly benefited the Soviet economy.

In the planned and centralized Soviet economy, all scientific and technological cooperation with foreign business partners was developed according to the guidelines of the multiple-year plans. These were prepared by a special State Committee on Scientific-Technological Cooperation in constant consultation with the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the CC CPSU. Preference was always given to socialist states loyal to the Kremlin. As the introduction of the "Prospective Plan of Scientific-Technological Cooperation for 1973-1975" from April 1973 demonstrates, the intention was to "widen and deepen cooperation" with the countries of the socialist camp.⁸⁵ This cooperation was directed at "strengthening the economic potential of the world socialist system." There were only a few references to "further cooperation with capitalist countries,"⁸⁶ and these were restricted to the "study of experiences" or the "exchange of information." Only seldom was there mention of "exchange of licenses."

Moreover, West German firms were considered only one among numerous possible partners, including companies in the United States, Japan, Britain, France, and others. For example, the plan item dealing with the "creation and assimilation of powerful cost-effective units with nuclear reactors with a power capacity of 1,000 M/Watts, and turbines up to 500 M/Watts," described the cooperation with Westinghouse and Siemens as a "study of experiences"; but priority in cooperation was assigned to the industries of the Comecon countries.⁸⁷

CONCLUSION

This conclusion extends to the entire range of Soviet political developments by the mid-1970s.⁸⁸ Although General Secretary Brezhnev and his

84 Falin, *Bez skidok na obshchestva*, pp. 282-85.

86 Ibid., List 22.

88 Cf. Georgi Arbatov, *Zatyamuvshiesya vyzdorovleniye (1953-1985 gg.)*. [Long-Drawn Out Recovery. Testimony of a Contemporary] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1991), p. 193.

85 RGANI.E5.Op.66. D.191 Lists 1-420.

87 Ibid., List 26.

entourage proved to be extremely capable of overwhelming their domestic rivals, they were gravely deficient in other respects. Trained in the traditional Soviet manner, Brezhnev was unprepared to function as a major political leader of a superpower and to adapt his country to the challenges of the new scientific-technological age, particularly in regard to long-term planning and the computer revolution. The general secretary was more accustomed to conducting a confrontational policy in a bipolar world, making minor maneuvers in domestic politics, and paying special attention to old connections and familiar people.

Thus, Willy Brandt's resignation in 1974 was a serious blow to Brezhnev. The general secretary lost his trusted partner who had inadvertently facilitated his plans to assume unfettered power in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the West German chancellor might have been instrumental in helping Moscow pursue its political aims in Europe, around the world, and in the social democratic movement. To be sure, even before Brandt's fall, Soviet policy toward Germany was moving into a blind alley with no way out. An alternative way, proposed early in the *Ostpolitik* negotiations, was a reduction of troops and armaments in Europe. However, this solution was not to be found in Bonn alone but in all the NATO capitals and in Moscow itself.

The signing of treaties between West Germany and the Soviet bloc (the USSR, Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia) and the accession of both German states to the United Nations opened up the path to the Helsinki Act. It symbolized a normalization of the situation in Europe and marked a symbolic end to World War II. But relations between the USSR and the FRG could have expanded only if Moscow had fully accepted the ideology of social democracy and the possibility of convergence and had considered the possibility of permitting a freer political life in the Soviet Union. None of these was acceptable to the Kremlin during the 1970s or even later.

By the mid-1970s, Brezhnev and his clique had gained exclusive power. Brezhnev had every opportunity to take bold action; but he possessed neither the intellectual abilities nor the courage to do so decisively on the international or the domestic scene. In domestic policy, he hesitated to promote the "Complex Program of Scientific-Technological Progress for 1975-1990," which had been prepared by the major Soviet scientists after more than a year of intensive work. The authors, who had ties with Premier Kosygin and KGB head Andropov, were concentrated in the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology. Brezhnev's preoccupation with international affairs, the pressure of time, and the state of his health served as constant excuses for the general secretary to hide his inability to discuss complex matters. In international relations he decided against taking any decisive steps to formulate a new concept of

German unity, to shape the future of Soviet bloc, or to improve relations with a changing China. Instead he chose to follow the concepts of the late 1960s.

The new leadership that took power in the spring of 1973 did not alter the goals that had been worked out earlier by the collective leadership. The new façade, under the label of a "society of developed socialism" and framed by the new Soviet Constitution of 1977, was only a maneuver to avoid the need to solve pressing problems. Such a nonpolicy led the USSR to stagnation, internal erosion, and continuous degradation. The rising global energy prices after October 1973 were the only success for the Soviet leadership and allowed them to maintain a quasi-stability until the period of Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Therefore, the opening to Bonn did not solve Moscow's problems; indeed, the contradictions, hesitations, and obstacles devised by Brezhnev and his cohorts were symptomatic of a more profound impasse in Soviet politics.

Ostpolitik and Poland

KRZYSZTOF RUCHNIEWICZ

The victory of the SPD-FDP coalition in the 1969 autumn elections and the elevation of Willy Brandt to chancellor initiated a new period in the postwar history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). It also affected West Germany's actions in the international arena and its relations with other states. The new policy toward the Eastern bloc (*Ostpolitik*), promulgated by the SPD since the beginning of the 1960s, finally found suitable conditions for realization.

BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Almost two years earlier, in December 1967, a meeting took place in Vienna between Egon Bahr, a close associate of Willy Brandt, who was then foreign minister of the FRG, and Jerzy Raczkowski, the counselor to the Polish embassy. This was the first attempt in many years to hold "off-the-record" discussions between Polish and West German officials in which the positions of the two countries could be stated. Bahr expressed doubts about whether the Grand Coalition government in Bonn would last past the autumn elections in 1969. He also explained to his Polish colleague that the leaders of the SPD, Brandt and Herbert Wehner, were prepared to pull off a *fait accompli* that could not be reversed even if the conservatives emerged victorious at the polls. Bahr tried to convince Raczkowski that initiating talks on détente and on the stabilization of relations in Europe also lay in Poland's interest; bilateral talks, official or unofficial, were already taking place in various European capitals. According to Bahr, the most important task of West Germany's foreign policy was the conclusion of bilateral treaties renouncing the use of force against its European neighbors.

Yet Bahr also presented a surprisingly inflexible position on the matter of Poland's western border. In his opinion, "nothing can be done about

Brandt and Tito

Between Ostpolitik and Nonalignment

MILAN KOSANOVIĆ

INTRODUCTION

In 1957, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in accordance with its newly enunciated Hallstein Doctrine, broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia when the latter recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR). During the next eleven years, bilateral ties between Bonn and Belgrade were generally of an economic nature. When diplomatic relations were restored in 1968, political contacts also developed despite the fact that Bonn and Belgrade followed two different foreign policy strategies, in both multilateral and global terms. The phase between 1968 and 1973 was characterized by the culmination of Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy and the onset of West Germany's *Ostpolitik*.

BILATERAL RELATIONS BEFORE 1968

During the initial stage of Yugoslav-West German relations, between 1951 and 1957, there were several points of dispute. Among these was the question of the German minority in Yugoslavia, which had been subject to reprisals, including detention, criminal prosecution, and expropriation. Moreover, in 1953 Yugoslavia made compensation claims against the FRG for damages that had occurred during World War II.¹ The issues of the German

The author thanks Ms. Nada Pantelić from the Archive of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, Serbia, for her very kind personal assistance.

1 According to the fourth part of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 (later specified by the London Debt Agreement of 1953), Yugoslavia, together with seventeen other allied states, was to be compensated from the Western Occupation Zone (so-called *Westmasse*), that is, by the later Federal Republic of Germany. Reparation claims of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the Federal

minority and German prisoners of war were easily solved. The former, after renouncing their Yugoslav citizenship, were allowed to immigrate to the Federal Republic. Prisoners of war were expelled almost without exception. However, the question of the war indemnity remained unsolved and became moot after Yugoslavia recognized the GDR.

In 1961 there was more ill feeling after the first conference of nonaligned states met in Belgrade. When the German question was discussed, almost every head of government referred to *two* German states.² Moreover, Tito assured his ~~neutral colleagues~~ that despite the rupture of diplomatic ties, the FRG had continued to pursue economic relations. ~~Bonn, in retaliation, took steps to reduce these economic ties.~~

By the mid-1960s relations had gradually improved. The influx of Yugoslav migrant workers into the FRG in the 1960s introduced a new element into their bilateral relations. However, Tito's visit to the GDR in 1965 and Ulbricht's return visit to Belgrade in 1966 again forced Bonn to evaluate its stance toward Yugoslavia. Bonn officials protested that by maintaining diplomatic relations with the GDR, Yugoslavia had denied the FRG's "right to represent the interests of Germany as whole."³ To be sure, Tito moved cautiously,⁴ and the FRG hesitated to apply strong pressure on him; even after this newest irritant, economic consultations continued.⁵

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS RESTORED: 1968

With the 1966 change of government in the FRG and Willy Brandt's accession to the Foreign Ministry, Yugoslavia had hoped for an improvement in its relations with the FRG. In January 1967, West Germany and Romania established full diplomatic relations. In order to bring this step into conformity with its foreign policy, the Bonn government announced the so-called

Republic of Germany, Archive of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter AP-SFRJ), I-5-b, Federal Republic of Germany, 1966.

2 William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 123.

3 Note on the conversation between Rožman, acting head of the representation of Yugoslav interests, the Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the presence of the ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden, Jödahl, and Lahr, state secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 19, 1965. Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (hereafter PoJA-MSP), 1965, vol. 119.

4 Information about the relations between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany, concerning the visit of comrade president of the GDR, February 23, 1965, PoJA-MSP, 1965, vol. 119.

5 Report on the first consultation between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn from April 7-9, 1965. PoJA-MSP, 1965, vol. 119.

Geburtsfehler-Theorie.⁶ Because Romania had established its diplomatic relations with the GDR in 1949, six years before the Hallstein Doctrine, it was not subject to its consequences.

Yugoslavia was dismayed by this event. Because of its more developed economic ties with the FRG, the large number of Yugoslav migrant workers, and the increasing number of West German tourists, Belgrade was disappointed that Romania had been chosen first.⁷

West Germany's emissary in Yugoslavia suggested a new approach:

If we establish diplomatic relations with some East European states, what will be the impact on Yugoslavia? If, in altering our previous position we, in addition to the Soviet Union, now send ambassadors to other East European states, we will be unable in the long to exclude Yugoslavia. This proposal is aimed at avoiding the untenable situation of giving preference to states in the Moscow camp over Yugoslavia, which is revisionist, a neutral, and, in a whole series of practical relations, closely bound to us. It would be difficult to explain to the world such a decision, for we are also trying to convince the world of our desire to ease tensions by establishing diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe in order to escape our isolation in foreign policy. This is all the more essential, because Yugoslavia urgently wants normal relations with us.⁸

There were two major impediments in FRG-Yugoslav bilateral relations. First, the *Geburtsfehler-Theorie* could not be applied to the Yugoslav case; and second, although Brandt was now willing to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger was reluctant. Influential members of the chancellor's CDU party demanded that Tito accept "the right of national self-determination," that is, the self-determination of the population of the GDR.⁹

It was nonetheless clear that if the Bonn government wished to reach out to Eastern Europe, it could not ignore Belgrade, which occupied a special position in the region and in the world.¹⁰ After a trade mission was

6 The *Geburtsfehler-Theorie* (literally "theory of congenital defect") was invented by the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic: Socialist states that had recognized the GDR according to international law before 1955, meaning before the Federal Republic and the USSR had established diplomatic relations, had no "other choice" and were therefore not subject to sanctions as usually stipulated by the Hallstein Doctrine.

7 Annual Report 1964 of the representation of Yugoslav interests at the protecting power in the Federal Republic of Germany, January 1965, PolA-MSP, 1965, vol. 118.

8 The representation of the Interests of the Federal Republic of Germany at the protecting power, the Embassy of the Republic of France in Yugoslavia, to the Foreign Ministry, January 11, 1967, Political Archive of the Foreign Office (hereafter PA AA) B 42/1002.

9 Telex by Kastl, head of Department II A 5, January 30, 1967, PA AA, B 42/1002. Kastl to State Secretary, December 13, 1967, *ibid.*, B 42/1002. Brandt to Kiesinger, March 6, 1967. *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (hereafter AAPD), 1967, vol. 1, p. 412.

10 Representation of Interests of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Embassy of the Republic of France in Yugoslavia to Foreign Ministry, Bonn, January 11, 1967. PA AA, B 42/1002.

opened in Prague in the summer of 1967, Willy Brandt repeated his desire to reestablish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. Bilateral negotiations between Bonn and Belgrade commenced in Paris on January 23, 1968, and went extremely smoothly. After Yugoslavia rebuffed Bonn's efforts to include the German question,¹¹ this issue was omitted. Only eight days after the start of the Paris negotiations, on January 31, 1968, the Bonn government resumed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and the Hallstein Doctrine had quietly expired.

BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1973

The principal topic of dispute between Bonn and Belgrade was the reparations question.¹² During the Paris negotiations, the FRG negotiator had insisted that unless Yugoslavia accepted West Germany's right to represent the entire German people there could be no agreement.¹³ When Brandt visited Belgrade in June 1968, he took a milder line, but also referred to the financial stakes and the possible claims by other East European states.¹⁴

After his talks in Belgrade with Foreign Minister Marko Nikezić, Brandt visited Tito in his summer residence on the Adriatic island of Brioni. When Tito raised the question of compensation, Brandt responded for the first time that he sought a solution based less on the past than on serving the future. In his subsequent remarks, he explicitly stressed the economic contributions of the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁵ Although this particular issue enjoyed the highest priority from the Yugoslav perspective, Tito gave a guarded response to Brandt's comments: "Let us first see how other problems go," thus concluding this part of the conversation.

11 AAPD 1968, vol. 1, p. 86. Telegram of the Foreign Ministry to the head of the Yugoslav delegation at the negotiation talks in Paris Perišić, January 26, 1968, PolA-MSP, 1968, vol. 167.

12 Before 1957, both states, after long and difficult negotiations, had agreed on a figure of DM 240 million as well as an additional DM 60 million for the period preceding 1939; but after the rupture of relations, the FRG insisted that the acceptance of its responsibility for reparations (according to the London agreement of 1953) was dependent on Yugoslavia's recognition of the German people's "right to self-determination." Relations between the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany (information for the preparation of the talks between President Tito and Chancellor Brandt), file 2, Reparation, AP-SFRJ, I-3-a, Federal Republic of Germany, 1973, visit of Willy Brandt. Information on the relations between the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the visit of Comrade President of the GDR Ulbricht on the 23rd February 1965, PolA-MSP, 1965, vol. 119.

13 AAPD 1968, vol. 1, p. 91.

14 AP-SFRJ, I-3-a, Federal Republic of Germany, 1968. However, in the report of the Foreign Ministry it was simply noted that the Yugoslavs had not explicitly stated their demands for reparation, but "have made clear that they continue to look for a solution for this question," PA AA B 42/1005.

15 AP-SFRJ, *ibid.* The Yugoslav document used the German term "Leistung."

Brandt's visit to Yugoslavia gave a preview of the conciliatory gestures to come.¹⁶ For example, he had proposed visiting Kragujevac, where in 1941 the Wehrmacht, in retaliation for a partisan attack on one of its units, had shot almost 5,000 Yugoslavs, including high school students, in a single day.¹⁷ The diplomats on both sides were surprised by this initiative. The Yugoslavs thought that the Germans had offered such a visit for reasons of politeness and were convinced that the Foreign Ministry did not share Brandt's purpose. The Auswärtiges Amt had always given a reserved response whenever Yugoslav diplomats had raised the possibility of a visit to Kragujevac and thus questioned the seriousness of the request.¹⁸ Afterward, Yugoslav diplomats reported that the Bonn government, despite official statements to the contrary, would welcome a cancellation of such a visit; but eventually it was Tito himself who cancelled the event, deeming it premature. The Yugoslav leader also refrained from commenting on speculation by his diplomats about the true intentions on the German side, and in 1968, the Belgrade government officially declined Brandt's offer. Five years later, however, as chancellor and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Brandt during his 1973 visit to Yugoslavia passed up Belgrade's suggestion to emulate his genuflection in Warsaw at Kragujevac.¹⁹

The reparations question was finally solved in April 1973 during Brandt's private meeting with Tito in Brioni.²⁰ For two years, the experts had thrashed out this issue and came to a practical solution under the label of *Kapitalhilfe*.²¹ According to this agreement, signed in Belgrade on December 21, 1972, Yugoslavia would receive a loan of DM 300 million under highly generous conditions, which would later become a part of a general reparations agreement between the two countries.²² During their private

16 Telex of the deputy head of mission of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Belgrade Loeck, June 4, 1968, PA AA, B 42/1005.

17 On the number of victims, see Milan Kosanović, *Die Entwicklung der jugoslawischen Koexistenz-Doktrin 1941–1957* (Bonn: Michael-Zikić-Stiftung, 2003), p. 27.

18 Note on the conversation between the head of the protocol department of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Lilić and the deputy head of mission of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Belgrade Loeck, June 4, 1968, AP-SFRJ, I-3-a, Federal Republic of Germany, 1968.

19 Note on the conversation between the head of the second department in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Pekić and the ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Belgrade Jaenicke, March 15, 1973, PoA-MSP, 1973, vol. 81.

20 Protocol of the private conversation between the chancellor and the Yugoslav president on Brioni, April 18, 1973, PA AA B 150/278.

21 *Kapitalhilfe* (capital assistance) is a form of support for developing countries.

22 Report on foreign policy information by the federal secretary for foreign relations, PoA-MSP, 1973, Top Secret, vol. 1. See also: Report on restitution of Yugoslav victims of Nazism by the federal secretary for foreign relations, PoA-MSP, 1973, Top Secret, vol. 1.

conversations, Brandt and Tito reviewed this agreement and came to an accord.²³

According to the Yugoslav version, Brandt raised the compensation issue during his meeting with Tito on April 18, 1973, by referring to his five-year-old formula "the future instead of the past." Then it was up to Tito to ask for German capital to aid his country. Brandt reacted by presenting a prepared proposal and showed it to Tito. Apparently the Yugoslav president was pleased and a solution was found.²⁴ Instead of formal reparations, Yugoslavia would receive extensive development aid up to a figure of DM 1 billion, which would include the DM 600 million in financial aid it had received since 1956 as well as the sums set forth in the 1972 *Kapitalhilfe* accord.²⁵ The two foreign ministries would work out the details.²⁶

Tito's willingness to forgo formal reparations created the decisive breakthrough in the compensation problem. The "Brioni Formula" resolved a problem that had strained West German-Yugoslav relations for more than two decades, and the agreement between Brandt and Tito met the needs of both sides. The FRG avoided a precedent that might fuel reparations demands from other East European countries; applying the Brioni Formula, Bonn would be able to offer financial aid and credits to Poland and others. Yugoslavia on its part received guarantees of generous German economic support for the next fifteen to twenty years, and the agreement cleared the air to discuss other pressing bilateral issues.²⁷

Also on the agenda at Brioni was the construction of a Yugoslav nuclear power plant. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the Belgrade government had displayed an increasing desire to produce nuclear energy, and Tito had hoped to gain West German support.²⁸ Brandt's response was positive, indicating that Bonn was not opposed to supporting the project. However, there was no further development on this issue, because Yugoslavia intended

23 Ibid.

24 Note on the talks between the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Tito and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Brandt, April 18, 1973, AP-SFRJ, I-3-a, Federal Republic of Germany, 1973. See also the final report on the visit of Chancellor Brandt to Yugoslavia of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, April 23, 1973, PoA-MSP, 1973, vol. 85.

25 Vladimir Ivanović, "Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka (1967–1973): između ideologije i pragmatizma" [Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany (1967–1973): Between Ideology and Pragmatism] (M.A. Thesis, University of Belgrade, 2006), p. 108.

26 Note of the head of the department Brockdorff on the importance of the "Brioni Formula" for long-term cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia, August 10, 1973, PA AA, Zwischenarchiv 112622.

27 Ibid. See the essay by Krzysztof Ruchniewicz in this volume.

28 Note on the conversation between the deputy Foreign Secretary Petrić with the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Belgrade Jaenicke, April 9, 1973, PoA-MSP, 1973, vol. 81. Eventually, a U.S.-German consortium helped build Yugoslavia's only nuclear power plant in the 1980s.

to explore other offers, in particular from the United States.²⁹ Significantly, the West German government had presented no objections to a potentially sensitive transfer of nuclear technology to a socialist state.

An even more difficult question involved Yugoslav migrant workers in the FRG. During the 1960s, when there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries, West German companies had recruited factory workers in an informal, uncoordinated manner, with highly prejudicial results. There were few Yugoslav consulates, work visas were compulsory, and Yugoslav workers suffered numerous disadvantages, among them the absence of financial support for their children. Brandt's visit to Yugoslavia in 1968 had helped to improve conditions, bringing the standards of treatment of Yugoslav workers in line with those from Turkey and Italy.³⁰ Still, many grievances remained, and Yugoslav workers began turning more to the trade unions than to the emissaries of Yugoslavia.³¹ After the restoration of relations in January 1968 a more stable situation was established. Negotiations that had been started three years earlier were completed and binding contracts were signed.³²

Other contentious elements were the activities in the FRG of political exiles from Yugoslavia. Numerous anticommunist activists who had collaborated with the Third Reich issued provocative statements and conducted subversive activities against the Belgrade regime. Yugoslav migrant workers, especially Croats, had joined these exile organizations. Moreover, in the 1960s there were several assassinations of Yugoslav diplomats in West Germany as well as counter assassinations of prominent anticommunist leaders.³³ Only after 1967 did Bonn begin to improve the security situation within its borders.³⁴

Willy Brandt's 1968 visit to Belgrade had also led to tangible progress in this matter. Politically motivated crimes by exiles were prosecuted by West German authorities through a stricter application of criminal law.

²⁹ Final report on the visit of Chancellor Brandt to Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, April 23, 1973, PoA-MSP, 1973, vol. 85.

³⁰ Brandt to Kiesinger in June 1968, PA AA B 42/1005.

³¹ Report of Comrade Avžner about the meeting of Yugoslav workers in Frankfurt, February 14, 1965, PoA-MSP, 1965, vol. 119.

³² AP-SFRJ, I-5-b, 1968, Federal Republic of Germany. Information about the negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany about the completion of a contract on the arrangement with the Yugoslav migrant workers in the Federal Republic as well as a convention on social security, May 6, 1965, PA-MSP, 1965, vol. 119.

³³ Report on the assassination of Consul Klarić, June 12, 1965, PoA-MSP, 1965, vol. 119.

³⁴ Letter from the representation of the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany at the protecting power in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry, January 11, 1967, PA AA, B 42/1002.

Brandt had also kept his promise to provide increased security for Yugoslav emissaries in the FRG.

Five years later in Brioni, Tito expressed his gratitude. Both statesmen recognized that this was a key issue in their bilateral relation and agreed that the intensive cooperation between their interior ministries had been vital to achieving success.³⁵

BILATERAL RELATIONS IN A MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENT

By the 1970s Yugoslavia had become a prominent player in international politics. Its nonalignment policy had not only enhanced its own security but had also created a global movement that challenged the superpowers' hegemony throughout the Third World. Although it was only an observer at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Yugoslavia hosted the first meeting of nonaligned states in Belgrade six years later. Tito, along with Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser, became an acknowledged leader of the bloc of nonaligned former colonies, which by 1976 numbered more than 100 members.

Not unexpectedly, the main part of the 1973 Brioni talks was devoted to international relations. In the course of their intensive discussions of the crises in the Middle East and Vietnam, the two leaders drew similar conclusions. When they turned to the topic of the nonaligned movement, Tito briefed Brandt on the upcoming meeting in Algiers.³⁶

But Tito's ambitions also extended into the global economic sphere. At the beginning of the 1970s Yugoslav companies were working all over the world. In particular, they were active in construction projects in the Arab countries, including Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya, and also in some African states. Furthermore, Yugoslav companies were represented in various nonaligned countries in such sectors as energy production, public health, agriculture, food production, and, last but not least, military supply and armament production.

However, Yugoslavia remained financially dependent on the capital of Western states, and here the Federal Republic played an important role. This was particularly true after personal consumption began to rise in Yugoslavia and created a mounting foreign debt. Tito had counted on West Germany to aid his international development policy, and Bonn

³⁵ Final report on the visit of Chancellor Brandt to Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, April 23, 1973, PA-MSP, 1973, vol. 85. Also AAPD 1973, vol. 1, p. 556.

³⁶ Ibid.

was initially receptive. During their talks in Cologne in October 1970, FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel had told Tito: "You have the political prestige and we the material resources."³⁷ For two decades, the FRG had conducted a successful development program in the Third World, using aid as a lever for its German policy. Tito's initiative was an attempt to compensate for Bonn's change in strategy caused by the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine.

But at Brioni, Brandt – who had already accomplished his main diplomatic goals and was about to bring West Germany into the United Nations – put a damper on Belgrade's ambitions. According to the Yugoslav records, the chancellor told Tito that West Germany had no intention of disrupting the GDR's existing projects in the Third World (although the German minutes omitted this statement). Did the Yugoslav secretary misunderstand the chancellor, or was Brandt's statement meant for Tito alone?³⁸

Indeed, there was no discussion in Brioni of any form of bilateral cooperation in the Third World. On the issue of development aid, especially in regard to Africa, Brandt admitted that the Federal Republic had not yet met the international guidelines of donating 0.7 percent of its gross domestic product, but he promised to make this one of his priorities. Except for a few joint ventures undertaken by the electronics company Siemens, West Germany declined Tito's offer of collaboration.³⁹ It was clear that the FRG did not need Yugoslavia as its partner. Indeed, Belgrade's role as a nonaligned dissident socialist country was less an advantage for Bonn in its dealings with the Third World than Tito imagined.

Nonetheless, these two governments would continue to conduct regular and personal consultations on bilateral and international questions. Indeed, at Brioni, Brandt had underlined the distinction between West Germany's perception of Yugoslavia as a state and of Tito as a world statesman. Thus, in his discussions with the Yugoslav prime minister Džemal Bijedić, the chancellor limited himself to bilateral issues, including economic and financial matters and problems involving migrant workers; but with Tito – except for the ticklish compensation question – Brandt focused on international

37 Protocol of the conversation of President Tito, October 11, 1970, AP-SFRJ, I-2, Federal Republic of Germany, 1970.

38 Protocol of the private conversation between the Yugoslav president and the chancellor on Brioni, April 18, 1973, AP-SFRJ, I-3-a, Federal Republic of Germany, 1973, visit of Willy Brandt. Compare with: Protocol of the private conversation between the chancellor and the Yugoslav president on Brioni, April 18, 1973, PA AA B 150/278.

39 Information on the talks between the President of the Federal Executive Council Bijedić and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Brandt in Belgrade, April 17, 1973, PolA-MSP, 1973, vol. 85.

politics, especially on the Middle East.⁴⁰ Tito, with his excellent connections to the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, could offer an informed perspective on that region and convey messages unofficially, especially to various Arab, African, and South American statesmen.⁴¹

Another important issue in West German–Yugoslav relations was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Belgrade government had long been a partisan of the Soviet-sponsored conference, believing that this offered the best solution to the German question. In principle, both Yugoslavia and the FRG agreed on the necessity of the CSCE; but Brandt and Tito avoided the German question during the Brioni meeting. Instead, the two leaders discussed détente in Central Europe and the need to include the Mediterranean situation in the conference proceedings, and both sides seemed to agree on these issues. Thus the Yugoslavs were surprised when the West German delegation insisted on omitting these and several other points from the final Brioni communiqué.⁴²

To be sure, the German Democratic Republic played only a minor role in Yugoslav foreign policy. This was the result of several factors, including East Germany's dependency on Moscow, Yugoslavia's direct links with the Soviet Union, East Berlin's hard-line approach toward Belgrade, and also the insignificant trade relations between the two communist countries.

Unlike the FRG, the GDR had offered to cooperate with Yugoslavia in the Third World.⁴³ However, the relations between Belgrade and East Berlin remained cool. There were no common initiatives toward Third World markets; and, except for their agreement on Germany's eastern border, Belgrade and East Berlin had no common position on the German Question. On the crucial questions involving the CSCE, it was the Federal Republic and not the GDR that was the more important partner.⁴⁴

Yet the relations between West Germany and Yugoslavia never became especially cordial. In addition to the long shadow of World War II and the prolonged and difficult compensation question, these governments had

40 Final report on the visit of Chancellor Brandt to Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, April 23, 1973, PolA-MSP, 1973, vol. 85.

41 AAPD 1973, vol. 1, p. 556.

42 Information on the negotiations about the common communiqué concerning the visit of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Brandt to Yugoslavia, April 15, 1973, PolA-MSP, 1973, vol. 85.

43 Aide-mémoire of the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic Steiner to the Assistant of the State Secretary Pavičević, January 11, 1965. PolA-MSP, 1965, vol. 115.

44 As the archival material indicates, Yugoslav-GDR relations were strictly concentrated on bilateral matters and lacked the personal bonds that existed between Tito and Brandt.

different political systems and foreign policy strategies, and this mutual distance negatively affected the prospects of expanding their cooperation into a broad partnership.

It was only during the period between 1966 and 1974 when Willy Brandt served as foreign minister and chancellor that relations between Belgrade and Bonn reached an amicable level. The issues originating with the Second World War were addressed and overcome through constructive approaches, and there were advances in mutual cooperation. However, these were restricted to the bilateral and not the multilateral realm. Brandt's accomplishment was not only to dissipate old rancors but also to suggest possibilities of global collaboration between the FRG and Yugoslavia without developing a "special relationship" with an – in many ways rather "special" – international actor like Belgrade.

Thanks to Brandt, political relations with Yugoslavia became normalized; but it was his connection with Tito – a bond between the anti-Nazi exile and the wartime partisan leader – that can be characterized as a unique offshoot of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. The Yugoslav president initially displayed Belgrade's traditional skepticism toward every West German politician and diplomat. These feelings evaporated after their first meeting in April 1968, which opened up an opportunity for a personal and political relationship based on a measure of reciprocity. Neither before 1966 nor after 1974 did Tito develop such a close association with a politician in either of the two German states. Although Egon Bahr also played an important role with regard to Yugoslavia, the improvement of Yugoslav-FRG relations after 1968 was undoubtedly the achievement of Brandt and Tito. Every solution to formerly contentious bilateral issues was the result of direct meetings between the two statesmen.

This relationship continued even after Brandt's resignation and was rooted in mutual respect. In 1984, four years after Tito's death, Brandt reflected in a preface to an edition of the Yugoslav president's speeches and writings on his international achievements:

Due to its geopolitical location a strong Yugoslavia, independent from the super-powers, has been a positive factor in defusing European tensions. If the community of non-aligned states did not exist today, it would have to be created. Such is their importance for the global politics of today. Tito was one of the creators. From Panch Schila's "Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence" in Bandung 1955, there was a straight line to the Brioni Declaration of Tito, Nasser, and Nehru and to the inaugural conference in Belgrade. From then on, the non-aligned states grew into an influential force that reminds the North of this globe of its

obligations to the South. Tito's foreign policy achievements, as documented in this volume, were contributions toward world peace. This is what defines his stature as a statesman.⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

After 1968, the ties between West Germany and Yugoslavia contained an inherent tension. While the two statesmen, Brandt and Tito, sought ways of transcending the limits of their bilateral relations, their foreign ministries were constrained by internal and practical circumstances.

Nonetheless, under Willy Brandt's leadership the relations between West Germany and Yugoslavia were expanded to an unprecedented degree. On the bilateral level, there were increased topics of discussion, including the question of migrant workers, and a tendency by both sides toward conciliation. On the multilateral level, despite their divergent interests over the CSCE and Third World ventures, there were also efforts to work together. Nonetheless, significant differences remained, not only in their political systems but also in their economic and international situations. Only occasionally, in their private meetings, could Brandt and Tito overcome these constraints.

45 Josip Broz Tito, *Reden und Schriften, 1945–1979*, vol. 3, no. 2 *Außenpolitik* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984), p. xi.